We distinguish scanning switches, which only enumerate states, from function switches which transform input states into output states. For the latter we introduce a logical network symbolism. Our history of early computer switching begins with the suggestions of Ramon Lull and Gottfried Leibniz, surveys the evolution of mechanical scanning switches and the first mechanical function switches, and then describes the first electromechanical function switches. The main themes of the present paper are that William S. Jevons built the first substantial function (...) switch (his logical piano), and that his work led to the design by Allan Marquand of the first substantial electromechanical function switch, as well as to Charles S. Peirce's idea for an electrical general-purpose programmable computer. These events all occurred fifty years before the first general-purpose programmable computers were constructed (in the 1940's), but they had no influence. (shrink)

We distinguish scanning switches, which only enumerate states, from function switches which transform input states into output states. For the latter we introduce a logical network symbolism. Our history of early computer switching begins with the suggestions of Ramon Lull and Gottfried Leibniz, surveys the evolution of mechanical scanning switches and the first mechanical function switches, and then describes the first electromechanical function switches. The main themes of the present paper are that William S. Jevons built the first substantial function (...) switch (his logical piano), and that his work led to the design by Allan Marquand of the first substantial electromechanical function switch, as well as to Charles S. Peirce's idea for an electrical general-purpose programmable computer. These events all occurred fifty years before the first general-purpose programmable computers were constructed (in the 1940's), but they had no influence. (shrink)

One task of logic, Peirce held, is to classify arguments so as to determine the validity of each kind. His own classification is interesting because it includes a novel type of argument in addition to the two traditionally recognized types. It is the purpose of this paper to discuss what Peirce thought to be sufficiently distinctive about abduction to warrant calling it a new kind of argument. But since one finds in his writings on abduction a number of different views (...) it is first necessary to make a few remarks concerning the unity of Peirce's thought. (shrink)

Because statements like ‘This object is soluble in aqua regia’ involve the causal modalities, we call them causal dispositional statements. Now while this involvement has long been recognized, no thorough examination of its exact nature has ever been made. One purpose of this paper is to begin such an examination. In Sec. 2 we will suggest an analysis of causal dispositional statements, and in Sec. 3 we will discuss some philosophic issues to which this analysis is relevant.

1. Introduction. It is generally admitted that a large part of man's knowledge is based on inductive arguments. Hence any philosophical theory concerning the nature of inductive arguments constitutes an epistemological theory. Any such philosophical theory of induction must, if it is to be satisfactory, take adequate account of Hume's criticism of inductive arguments. One way of treating his criticism is to say that the validity of inductive arguments is in an important sense relative to some broad factual assumptions about (...) the general nature of the universe and that these general factual assumptions are presupposed in a certain way by the users of inductive arguments. Let us call any theory of this general type a postulate theory of induction. (shrink)

This general type of view may be characterized more fully by using the notion of an inductive method. All scientists use approximately the same inductive method, which we will call the standard inductive method. This method is based on the rule of induction by simple enumeration, which may be roughly stated as follows: if it is known only that a certain property Ψ has accompanied another property Φ in a number of instances, then the larger this number of instances the (...) higher the probability that the next occurrence of Φ will be accompanied by Ψ. Though scientists actually reason inductively in accord with this rule, it is important that there are logically consistent inductive methods based on alternative rules. We will describe two of these briefly. The inverse inductive method assigns probabilities according to the rule that if it is known only that Ψ has accompanied Φ a number of times, then the larger the number of instances the lower the probability that the next occurrence of Φ will be accompanied by Ψ. The random predictive method assigns to the proposition that the next occurrence of Φ will be accompanied by Ψ a probability completely independent of the number of times that Ψ has accompanied Φ in the past.. (shrink)

In this paper I synthesize a unified system out of Peirce's life work, and name it Peirce's Evolutionary Pragmatic Idealism. Peirce developed this philosophy in four stages: His 1868–69 theory that cognition is a continuous and infinite social semiotic process, in which Man is a sign. His Popular Science Monthly pragmatism and frequency theory of probabilistic induction. His 1891–93 cosmic evolutionism of Tychism, Synechism, and Agapism. Pragmaticism: The doctrine of real potentialities, and Peirce's pragmatic program for developing concrete reasonableness. Peirce's (...) evolutionary conception of the cosmos is pantheistic, and he constructed it to reconcile religion with Darwinian evolution. (shrink)

But even with respect to inductive arguments there are a number of different philosophical problems. One is to make explicit the fundamental or most general pattern or patterns of inductive argument. Once these patterns are known a second and third problem arise. The second is to justify man's use of and faith in inductive arguments. And the third is to formulate some general propositions about nature which could reasonably be accepted by users of inductive arguments and which when added to (...) the premises of these arguments make them explicitly deductive. (shrink)

Opposition: Obedience and authority in Exodus 32-34 / George W. Coats -- The theological significance of contradiction within the Book of the Covenant / Paul D. Hanson -- The renewed authority of Old Testament wisdom for contemporary faith / Wayne Sibley Towner -- A stylistic study of the priestly creation story / Bernhard W. Anderson -- "I will not cause it to return" in Amos 1 and 2 / Rolf P. Knierim.